Standard algorithms for association rule mining are based on identification of frequent itemsets. In this paper, we study how to maintain privacy in distributed mining of frequent itemsets. That is, we study how two (or more) parties can find frequent itemsets in a distributed database without revealing each party's portion of the data to the other. The existing solution for vertically partitioned data leaks a significant amount of information, while the existing solution for horizontally partitioned data only works for three parties or more. In this paper, we design algorithms for both vertically and horizontally partitioned * Work done while the author was at Yale University. A previous version of this paper appeared as Yale University Technical Report Yale-DCS-TR1255 in August 2003. 1 data, with cryptographically strong privacy. We give two algorithms for vertically partitioned data; one of them reveals only the support count and the other reveals nothing.
Introduction
Data mining has been studied extensively and applied widely [29, 31, 30] . Through the use of data-mining techniques, businesses can discover hidden patterns and rules in a database and then employ them to predict features of data items that have not yet arrived. An important scenario in data mining is distributed data mining, in which a database is distributed between two (or more) parties, and each party owns a portion of the data. These parties need to collaborate with each other so that they can jointly mine the data and produce results that are interesting to both of them. Privacy concerns are of great importance in this scenario, because each party may not want to reveal her own portion of the data, although she would like to participate in the mining. This paper is concerned with a major category of data mining, namely mining of association rules. Consider the transaction database of a supermarket. We may find that most of those who buy bread also buy milk. Therefore, "bread ⇒ milk," which means "buying bread implies buying milk," is a candidate association rule. Two metrics are defined to measure such a candidate rule: confidence and support. Here confidence means the number of transactions in which both bread and milk are bought divided by the number of transactions in which bread is bought. Support means the number of transactions in which bread and milk are bought divided by the overall number of transactions. A candidate is considered a valid association rule if both its confidence and its support are sufficiently high.
Standard algorithms for association-rule mining are based on identification of frequent itemsets [3] . We say that bread and milk constitute a frequent itemset if, in a sufficiently large percentage of transactions, both of them are bought. If all frequent itemsets can be computed, then all association rules can be computed easily from the frequent itemsets.
In this paper, we address the question of how to maintain privacy in distributed mining of frequent itemsets. That is, we ask how two (or more) parties can find frequent itemsets in a distributed database without revealing each party's portion of the data to the other. We will formally specify what we mean by "privacy," and our definitions of privacy are cryptographically strong (see Definitions 3 and 4 for details). Roughly speaking, for strong privacy, we require that each participant learns nothing about other participants' data except what is implied by the final output. For weak privacy, we relax the requirement a little to allow that the support count of candidate itemset is leaked to each participant. We will also give solutions for two major types of partitioned data: vertically partitioned and horizontally partitioned(to be defined rigorously in Section 2), respectively, and show that our algorithms preserve privacy.
Related Work To the best of our knowledge, Clifton and his students were the first to study privacy-preserving distributed mining of association rules and frequent itemsets. In [26] , Vaidya and Clifton gave a nice algebraic solution for vertically partitioned data. However, this solution can leak many linear combinations of each party's private data to the other. Furthermore, to process one candidate frequent itemset, its computational overhead is quadratic in the number of transactions. In [18, 19] , Kantarcioglu and Clifton gave a solution for horizontally partitioned data that uses Yao's generic secure-computation protocol as a subprotocol. However, as Goldreich pointed out in [13] , generic secure-computation protocols are highly expensive for practical purposes. (In data mining problems, because the input size is huge, they can be even more expensive than in other applications.) Furthermore, the solution in [18, 19] only works for three parties or more, not for two parties. Privacy-preserving data mining has been a topic of active study (see, e.g., papers by Agrawal and his collaborators [2, 1] ). In particular, many papers have addressed the privacy issues in mining of association rules and frequent itemsets. Some examples are [8, 10, 24, 23, 25] .
However, these papers are concerned with privacy of individual transactions and/or hiding of sensitive rules. The scenarios they consider are significantly different from ours. We consider a scenario of distributed database, where each part of the data is owned by a different participant.
Our target is to protect the private data owned by each participant.
Privacy-preserving distributed mining was first addressed by Lindell and Pinkas [21, 22] , but their paper only discusses the classification problem ("classifying transactions into a discrete set of categories"), not the association-rule problem.
As pointed out by Du and Atallah [9] , the problems of privacy-preserving data mining can be 1 In [19] , Kantarcioglu and Clifton discussed the difficulty of two parties. In particular, they mentioned that the support count of one participant can be derived by the other participant, by subtracting his own support count from the overall support count. This problem does not exist with our strongly privacy-preserving algorithm in Section 5, because our algorithm does not output the overall support count-it only outputs whether the overall support count is above the threshold.
viewed as an application of generic secure computation. Existing protocols for generic secure computation [28, 4, 12, 6] can solve such problems in theory. However, these generic protocols are highly expensive; and therefore it is our goal to design special-purpose solutions that are much more efficient for certain problems of interest.
Goethals, et al. [16] proposed a solution very similar to our strongly privacy-preserving algorithm for vertically partition data. However, their solution is based on additively homomorphic encryption schemes, while our strongly privacy-preserving solution for vertically partitioned data is based on multiplicatively homomorphic encryption schemes. The state-of-art additively homomorphic encryption schemes are significantly slower than their multiplicatively homomorphic counterpartners. For example, the Paillier encryption scheme (which is a suggested choice of encryption scheme in [16] ) is about 8 times slower than the ElGamal encryption scheme (which is a suggested choice of encryption scheme in this paper) in both encryption and decryption. The improved versions by Damagard and Judik [7] have different efficiency for different operations, but they are all significantly slower than ElGamal. Consequently, our solution is significantly more efficient than Goethals, et al.'s protocol. Assuming the Paillier encryption scheme is used in [16] , we estimate that our protocol is about 3 times faster than [16] .
Wright and Yang [27] gave another protocol based on additively homomorphic encryption, which could be used to solve our problem on vertically partitioned data. Assuming that they use Paillier encryption scheme as suggested in their paper, we estimate that their computational cost is about 1.5 times of ours.
Rozenberg and Gudes [17] also worked on this problem and gave practical solutions for vertically partitioned data. But as they mentioned in [17] , their solutions are not "zero-knowledge" (i.e., not fully private in the cryptographic sense).
Our Contributions In this paper, we rigorously specify the problems and security requirements of privacy-preserving mining of frequent itemsets. Our definitions of privacy are cryptographically strong. We give algorithms for privacy-preserving mining of vertically and horizontally partitioned data.
For vertically partitioned data, we design algorithms with two levels of privacy. Our algorithms are very efficient in that their computational overheads are linear in the number of transactions.
For horizontally partitioned data, our algorithm is more efficient than the existing solutions.
In addition, our algorithm works not only for three parties and above but also for two parties.
Paper Organization The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem formulation and the definitions of privacy. In Sections 3 and 4, we describe two two-party algorithms for vertically partitioned data, one that provides a weak privacy guarantee and one a strong privacy guarantee. In Section 5, we give a two-party algorithm for horizontally partitioned data. In section 6, we show how to extend the algorithms to distributed mining of more than two parties. We conclude in Section 7. We define the support count of an itemset as the number of transactions that contain this itemset. Formally, let C be the set of columns corresponding to an itemset. The support count of the itemset {I j |j ∈ C} is S = |{i|∀j ∈ C, D(i, j) = 1}|. Therefore, to decide whether the itemset {I j |j ∈ C} is frequent, we actually need to decide whether S > β% · n (recall that n is the number of transactions).
As pointed out in [26] , the support count S is essentially the inner product of all columns in set C. Because D is a boolean matrix,
where
. . , D n,j ) stands for the jth column of D. Therefore, the problem of frequentitemset mining amounts to comparing this inner product with the threshold β% · n.
Vertically Partitioned and Horizontally Partitioned data We consider our problem with respect to two types of partitioned data, namely vertically partitioned and horizontally partitioned data. Intuitively, having vertically partitioned data means that each party owns some columns of the matrix D, while having horizontally partitioned data means that each party owns some rows. (For simplicity, we assume that, with vertically partitioned data, each participant has exactly the same transactions in both databases.) For simplicity, at this point we only discuss two-party distributed mining and leave the extension to more parties to Section 6.
Suppose that the two parties are A and B.
Formally, if the data are vertically partitioned, then A (resp., B) owns a set C A (resp., C B )
of columns of the boolean matrix D, where
Recall that we are studying an itemset {I j |j ∈ C}. The column set C of this itemset is partitioned into two 8 subsets -C ∩ C A , which is owned by A, and C ∩ C B , which is owned by B. It is easy to see
.
Note that A can privately compute all
x i s and that B can privately compute all y i s. Let t = β% · n. Therefore, our problem can be formulated as follows.
Problem 1 (Problem for Vertically Partitioned Data) A has a private input
, and B has a private input y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) (y i ∈ {0, 1}). A and B have a public
Remark: We note that the above problem formulation only considers a single candidate itemset and decides whether it is frequent. In [26] , Vaidya and Clifton gave a thorough discussion of how to find all frequent itemsets using an algorithm that solves the above problem. Interested readers can refer to [26] for details. The main ideas can be summarized as follows:
• We compute frequent k-itemsets for k = 1 through m.
• To compute frequent k-itemsets, we first generate candidate itemsets based on frequent
• If all attributes of a candidate itemset belong to a single party, the party decides locally whether it is frequent. Otherwise, run a protocol to decide whether it is frequent.
While Vaidya and Clifton suggest to use Agrawal and Srikant's classic algorithm [3] for generating candidate itemsets, we note that we can also use another algorithm as long as the algorithm will not miss any frequent itemset. The (worst-case) time complexity of computing all frequent itemsets is about
where CandidateGenTime k is the time complexity of generating candidate k-itemsets, CandidateNum k is the number of candidate k-itemsets generated, and ProtocolTime is the running time of a protocol solving the problem we formulated above. The space complexity is about
where FreqNum k is the number of frequent k -itemsets, CandidateGenSpace k is the space complexity of generating candidate k-itemsets, and ProtocolSpace is the space complexity of a protocol solving the problem we formulated above.
A similar argument also applies to our problem formulation for horizontally partitioned data given below. We can develop an algorithm for finding all frequent itemsets using exactly the same ideas. In particular, we note that standard data structures for counting itemsets can be used without change. The time and space complexities are identical to the corresponding complexities in the vertical case, except that ProtocolTime and ProtocolSpace are now the time and space complexities of a protocol solving the problem for horizontally partitioned data.
Nevertheless, we note that a larger algorithm built upon privacy-preserving blocks (like [26] or ours) may lose part of the privacy protection, since the compositions used in building the larger algorithm may not be always secure.
If the data are horizontally partitioned, then A (resp., B) owns a set R A (resp., R B ) of rows, 
Model and Definitions of Privacy
Semi-Honest Model As in previous works on privacy-preserving distributed mining (e.g., [21] ), we assume that the participants are semi-honest. That is, each participant follows the protocol, but can attempt to derive private information that it is not supposed to know. We stress that this is a practical model for distributed data mining, because distributed data mining is usually a very complex and highly important task, and so the participants may not want to risk failing in mining just to violate other's privacy. Of course, in some cases malicious participants may want to violate others' privacy at the cost of failing in mining. But studying the problem in the semi-honest models allows us to develop solutions in a simplified scenario; having these solutions, we can always extend them to the malicious model by suppressing malicious behavior using techniques like zero-knowledge proofs [11, 12] .
Since we assume a semi-honest model, certain attacks are not considered in this paper. For example, we do not consider probing attacks in which one participant sets his data to some specific values such that he can derive part of other participants' data from the final result. We note that, in practice, there are practical ways to prevent such probing attacks, for example the randomized perturbation approach [1, 2] .
Defining Privacy We specify our privacy requirements by adapting the standard definition of privacy for deterministic interactive protocols [13] to our distributed frequent-itemset mining problems. Note that such cryptographic definitions of privacy are very strong. Our definitions will apply to both the problem for vertically partitioned data and the problem for horizontally partitioned data.
Let s be a security parameter. Recall that A has private input x, B has private input y, and there is a public input t. Denote by V IEW A (x, y, t) (resp., V IEW B (x, y, t)) the view of A (resp.,
is defined to include x (resp., y), t, A's coin flips (resp., B's coin flips), and all messages A (resp., B) receives. Use ∼ ≡ to denote computational indistinguishability. (Intuitively, computational indistinguishability means that any polynomialtime algorithm cannot distinguish the two probability ensembles involved. Therefore, the two probability ensembles "are regarded as the same thing" by any polynomial-time adversary.
The standard definitions of probability ensembles and computational indistinguishability can be found in, e.g., [14] 
In this definition, we use to represent the information leaked by the algorithm. The definition states that, for each party, there exists a simulator that can simulate her view, given her own private input, the public input, and . Therefore, everything learned by this party is implied by (and her own private input as well as the public input).
It is clear that, in the best possible case, we could have an algorithm that leaks nothing but its output. For frequent-itemset mining, it is often also acceptable for an algorithm to leak the support count of a candidate. So we distinguish two levels of privacy, namely strong privacy and weak privacy. 3 Weakly Privacy-Preserving Algorithm for Vertically Partitioned Data
Overview
Recall that, in the problem of vertically partitioned data, A has a private input (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and B has a private input (y 1 , . . . , y n ). We need to design an algorithm to decide whether n i=1 x i y i > t, where t is a public input.
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We build our weakly privacy-preserving algorithm based on probabilistic public-key encryption. Consider a probabilistic public-key encryption scheme whose cleartext space is {0, 1}. Let For weak privacy, we only need to compute S = n i=1 x i y i and compare it to the threshold t. The main idea of our algorithm is that A counts the number of 1s in a random permutation of (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ) -this number equals to n i=1 x i y i . As to privacy, A cannot learn more information because she only sees a random permutation.
More specifically, the algorithm has 3 steps. In Step 1, A encrypts (x 1 , . . . , x n ) using her own public key (so that B cannot decrypt them) and sends the encryptions to B. In Step 2, B computes encryptions of (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ) from these encryptions. Then B rerandomizes the newly computed encryptions, permutes them, and sends them to A. In Step 3, A decrypts the encryptions she received and counts the number of 1s and compare it to the threshold.
The only thing left is how B computes encryptions of (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ) from encryptions of 
Algorithm Summary

Mine1(A, B, x, y)
A's Input:
Step 1 (1.1) For i = 1, . . . , n, A encrypts x i using public key k p :
, where r i is picked uniformly at random.
Step 2 (2.1) For i = 1, . . . , n, B computes Z i , an encryption of z i = x i y i as follows:
(2.3) B permutes Z as follows:
, where π is a random permutation on [1, n] .
Step 3 SIM B simulates message X by generating n random ciphertexts. If S > t, SIM B simulates the public output using "This is a frequent itemset;" if S ≤ t, it simulates the public output using "This is not a frequent itemset."
Security Analysis
Efficiency Analysis
Computational Overhead The algorithm Mine1 needs to compute at most 2n encryptions, n rerandomizations, and n decryptions.
Assume that we use the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme. Then each encryption amounts to one modular multiplication, where the modulus is s-bit. Each rerandomization costs two modular multiplications. Decryption is more expensive -two modular exponentiations, which are equivalent to no more than 2s modular multiplications. To summarize, the overall computational overhead is no more than (2s + 4)n modular multiplications.
Communication Overhead
The algorithm Mine1 needs to transfer 2n items, each of s bits.
Therefore, the overall communication overhead is 2sn bits.
Strongly Privacy-Preserving Algorithm for Vertically
Partitioned Data
Overview
Homomorphic Encryption We build our strongly privacy-preserving algorithm based on a class of homomorphic encryption. We need a probabilistic public-key encryption algorithm F that satisfies the following conditions:
• The cleartext space M is a large field of size Θ(2 s ). Furthermore, the size is greater than 2n + 1.
• It is not necessary to have an efficient general decryption algorithm; however, there exists an efficient algorithm that uses the private key to decide whether a ciphertext decrypts to 0.
• There is an efficient rerandomization algorithm.
• F is additively homomorphic. That is, for m 1 , m 2 ∈ M,
is an encryption of m 1 + m 2 , where is an "addition" operation that can be performed without decrypting F (m 1 , r 1 ) or F (m 2 , r 2 ).
• F allows homomorphic computing of constant multiplication. That is, for m 1 ∈ M and constant c 1 ,
is an encryption of c 1 m 1 , where • is a "constant multiplication" operation that can be performed without decrypting F (m 1 , r 1 ).
One example of F is a variant of ElGamal encryption:
, where g is a generator of a group in which the discrete-logarithm is hard. Note that F is semantically secure under the standard Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption [5] . The second condition above is satisfied, because we can use the private key to compute g m i from a ciphertext and compare it with g 0 , i.e., compare it with 1. The third condition is satisfied, because we can use the well-known rerandomization algorithm for ElGamal. To satisfy the fourth condition, we define, for any ciphertexts (M 1 , G 1 ) and (M 2 , G 2 ),
To satisfy the fifth condition, we define, for any constant c 1 ,
The reader can easily verify that implements addition and • implements constant multiplication.
Algorithm Design Recall that the support count of the candidate itemset is S, i.e., S = n i=1 x i y i . For strong privacy, our algorithm needs to decide whether S > t without revealing S to either A or B. The main idea of our algorithm is that S > t if and only if there exists a 0
We would be able to solve this problem immediately if the vector
However, for strong privacy, this vector cannot be revealed. Therefore, we reveal a masked vector (r 1 (
instead, where r 1 , . . . , r n are non-zero elements of M chosen independently and uniformly at random. Note that this masked vector has a 0 if and only if the original vector has a 0. On the other hand, all non-zero elements in the original vector have been replaced by randomized elements in the masked vector, and so no extra information is leaked. In this way, the algorithm can decide whether S > t without revealing any extra information.
More specifically, the algorithm has 3 steps. In Step 1, A encrypts (x 1 , . . . , x n ) using her own public key (so that B cannot decrypt them) and sends the encryptions to B. In Step 2, B computes encryptions of (r 1 (S − t − 1), . . . , r n (S − t − n)) from these encryptions. Then B rerandomizes the newly computed encryptions, permutes them, and sends them to A. In Step 3, A checks these encryptions to see whether there is one that decrypts to 0.
The only thing left is how B computes encryptions of (r 1 (S − t − 1) , . . . , r n (S − t − n)) from the encryptions of (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Observe that, because
Therefore, B can sum up all encryptions of x i where y i = 1, to get an encryption of S. Then, using the homomorphic property of F , B can compute encryptions of (r 1 (S − t − 1) , . . . , r n (S − t − n)), because t is public, and the r i s are picked by B.
Algorithm Summary
Mine2 (A, B, x, y) A's Input:
Step 1
Step 2
x i y i as follows:
• S = F k p (0, 0);
2) For i = 1, . . . , n, B picks r i ∈ M − {0} uniformly at random and computes an encryption of
. . , U n ) as follows:
Step 3
If one of U i s decrypts to 0, A outputs "This is a frequent itemset;" otherwise, A outputs "This is not a frequent itemset." simulates message X using n random ciphertexts. If o = 1, SIM B simulates the public output using "This is a frequent itemset;" if o = 0, it simulates the public output using "This is not a frequent itemset."
Security Analysis
Efficiency Analysis
Computational Overhead The algorithm Mine2 needs to compute 2n + 1 encryptions, and n rerandomizations. It also needs to check n ciphertexts to see whether they decrypt to 0. In addition, it needs to compute for 2n times and • for n times.
Assume that we use the variant of ElGamal encryption:
. Then each encryption amounts to three modular exponentiations plus one modular multiplications, where the modulus is s-bit. Each rerandomization costs two modular exponentiations plus two modular multiplications. It takes one modular exponentiation plus one modular multiplication to check whether a ciphertext decrypts to 0. Computing costs two modular multiplications, while computing • costs two modular exponentiations. To summarize, the overall computational overhead is no more than (11s + 9)n + (3s + 1) modular multiplications.
Communication Overhead The communication overhead of Mine2 is also 2sn bits.
5 Algorithm for Horizontally Partitioned Data
Overview
Recall that, in the problem for horizontally partitioned data, A has a private input x and B has a private input y. We need to design an algorithm to decide whether x + y > t where t is public.
We still build a strongly privacy-preserving algorithm based on homomorphic encryption. We use the homomorphic encryption scheme F specified in Section 4.
For strong privacy, our algorithm needs to decide whether x + y > t without revealing x to B or revealing y to A. The main idea of our algorithm is that x + y > t if and only if there exists a 0 in More specifically, the algorithm has 3 steps. In Step 1, A encrypts x using her own public key (so that B cannot decrypt them) and sends the encryptions to B. In Step 2, B computes encryptions of (r 1 (x + y − t − 1), . . . , r n (x + y − t − n)) from the encryption of x, using the homomorphic property of F . Then B rerandomizes the newly computed encryptions, permutes them, and sends them to A.
In
Step 3, A checks these encryptions to see whether there is one that decrypts to 0.
Algorithm Summary
Mine3(A, B, x, y)
, where r is picked uniformly at random.
Step 2 
If one of U i s decrypts to 0, A outputs "This is a frequent itemset;" otherwise, A outputs "This is not a frequent itemset." If o = 1, SIM A simulates message U using one random encryption of 0 and n − 1 random encryptions of random elements of M − {0}, in a random order; otherwise, SIM A simulates U using n random encryptions of random elements of M − {0}, in a random order.
Security Analysis
We construct SIM B as follows. SIM B simulates the coin flips of B in the algorithm.
SIM B simulates message X using a random encryption. If o = 1, SIM B simulates the public output using "This is a frequent itemset;" otherwise, it simulates the public output using "This is not a frequent itemset."
Efficiency Analysis
Computational Overhead The algorithm Mine3 needs to compute n + 1 encryptions, and n rerandomizations. It also needs to check n ciphertexts to see whether they decrypt to 0. In addition, it needs to compute and • for n times, respectively.
Assume that we use the variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme:
. Then the overall computational overhead is (8s + 6)n + (3s + 1) modular multiplications.
24
The existing solution for horizontally partitioned data only works for three parties or more.
In Section 6, we will show how to extend our algorithm Mine3 to more parties. Our extended algorithm is more efficient than the existing solution, because the latter uses Yao's generic secure computation protocol.
Communication Overhead The communication overhead of Mine3 is sn + s bits.
Extension to Multiparty Distributed Mining
In this section, we demonstrate how to extend our algorithms to multiparty distributed mining.
To avoid overly complicated notations, instead of presenting general algorithms for k parties, we give three-party algorithms for vertically and horizontally partitioned data, respectively. It is straightforward to further extend our algorithms to more parties in a similar way.
Algorithm for Vertically Partitioned Data
Now we extend our strongly privacy-preserving algorithm Mine2 to three-party distributed mining.
Suppose that we have the third party C with private input (z 1 , . . . , z n ). The extended algorithm has 4 steps. In Step 1, A encrypts (x 1 , . . . , x n ) using her own public key and sends the encryptions to B. In Step 2, B computes encryptions of (x 1 y 1 , . . . , x n y n ) and sends them to C. In Step 3, C computes (r 1 (
). Then C rerandomizes these newly computed encryptions, permutes them, and sends them to A. In Step 4, A checks the encryptions she received to see whether there is one that decrypts to 0. Note that Steps 1, 3, and 4 of the extended algorithm correspond to Steps 1, 2, and 3 of algorithm Mine2, respectively. The only new step is Step 2, which is based on the fact that x i y i = x i if y i = 1, and x i y i = 0 otherwise.
Algorithm for Horizontally Partitioned Data
Now we extend our algorithm Mine3 to three-party distributed mining.
Suppose that we have the third party C with private input z. The extended algorithm has 4 steps. In Step 1, A encrypts x using her own public key and sends it to B. In Step 2, B computes an encryption of x + y and sends it to C. In Step 3, C computes encryptions of (r 1 (x + y + z − t − 1), . . . , r n (x + y + z − t − n)) using the homomorphic property of F . Then C rerandomizes these newly computed encryptions, permutes them, and sends them to A. In Step 4, A checks the encryptions she received to see whether there is one that decrypts to 0. Note that Steps 1, 3, and 4 of the extended algorithm correspond to Steps 1, 2, and 3 of algorithm Mine3, respectively. The only new step is Step 2, which is also based on the homomorphic property of F .
Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we study privacy preserving algorithms for distributed mining of frequent itemsets. Our algorithms provide very strong privacy guarantee as defined in cryptography. They have computational overheads linear in the number of transactions and therefore are very efficient.
Our algorithms should be used with care in practice. First, these algorithms are designed for the semi-honest model, but in some practical scenarios, participants may deviate from the pro-tocol. Therefore, in these scenarios, techniques like zero-knowledge proofs should be employed to prevent malicious behavior. Second, in some practical scenarios, malicious participants may want to launch probing attacks by changing their own data. As we have mentioned, such probing attacks should be prevented using techniques like randomized perturbation. Third, when the data is vertically partitioned, the set of transactions owned by each participant may not be identical. In this case, an extension of our algorithm is needed. In summary, when our algorithms are used in practice, they should be complemented by other techniques and be adapted to the concrete settings.
What our algorithms do is privately deciding whether an input itemset is frequent or not.
As a result, if we use these algorithms to compute frequent itemsets, we need to test each candidate itemset individually. A natural open question is whether there exists a private and efficient algorithm that computes all frequent itemsets without testing candidates one by one.
Furthermore, we ask whether exists a private and efficient algorithm that computes association rules without revealing all frequent itemsets. We will study these problems in our future research. a random number mod N . To decrypt a ciphertext, one only needs to compute the Legendre symbols of the ciphertext mod P and mod Q.
